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Abstract   
Earnings management is typically achieved via discretionary accruals (such as 
depreciation). Dechow et al. (1996), Archibald (1972), and Peasnell et al. (2000) present 
results on the market reaction to depreciation manipulation that are inconsistent. They find 
either no reaction or a negative one. This study aims at settling this contradiction by using 
several different methods, in order to identify a possible manipulation, with a sample of 
S&P500 firms.   
Data suggests that firms are manipulating depreciation. Furthermore, an analysis of useful 
life of assets reveals that firms have been increasing it since the dot com bubble burst and 
that its value is larger in profitable firms. However, results of our event studies reveal that 
the market is not reacting to deprecation manipulation. Thus, it seems possible for firms to 
fool the markets via this specific manipulation. 
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1. Introduction  
 
Depreciation is one of the accounting activities that has a sizable impact on companies’ 
profits. There is some flexibility for calculating the value of depreciation, which in turn 
allows firms to window-dress their accounts to a certain extent. Depreciation manipulation 
is a tool of earnings management and, according to Bartov (1993), can be classified as an 
act of earnings-smoothing. Brenton and Stolowy (2004) state that the ―additional‖ fund 
(result of the manipulation of depreciation) can be saved over the good times and used over 
the bad ones, in this way smoothing the normal fluctuation of earnings.  
Manipulation of depreciation can be achieved in two ways: via switching depreciation 
method or changing estimation of assets useful life. The key reasons behind these changes 
are an aspiration to increase profits and a need to be comparable with the industry 
accounting standards (Healy and Wahlen, 1999). Comiskey (1971) indicates that a change 
from accelerated to straight line depreciation accounting method increases the reported 
earnings per share in all the companies included in her study of the steel market. Dechow et 
al. (1996) indicate that once earnings manipulation becomes known to the public, the price 
of the share drops accordingly to the amount that is perceived to be overstated. Archibald 
(1972) does not find abnormal performance of the stock during the announcement of the 
change of depreciation method. However, Peasnell et al. (2000), state that earnings 
management through depreciation manipulation is ―a somewhat transparent‖, and thus it 
does make an impact to the market price of the firm 
Plummer and Mets (2001) comment that ―although prior researches suggest that firms 
manage earnings to achieve certain reporting objectives, the literature provides limited 
evidence on which specific components or accruals are used for earnings management‖. 
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This study aims to enrich existing earnings management literature by studying financial 
markets’ reactions to the manipulation of depreciation. In order to identify the possible 
manipulation, four different depreciation manipulation proxies have been used. The first 
two estimate the value of abnormal depreciation (following the methodologies of 
Marquardt and Wiedman’s (2004) and Jennings and Marques (2006) (unpublished)), the 
third one is depreciation index (Beneish’s (1997) method) and the final one is useful life of 
assets (Jennings and Marques (2006) (unpublished)). The sample consists of firms from the 
Standard & Poor’s 500 Index (S&P500) and the data covers a period of 9 years (from 1999 
to 2007).   
The study yields three important results. First, by using four different methodologies it is 
found that firms manipulate depreciation to a certain extent. Second, useful life of asset 
over the sample has a tendency to increase since dot com burst bubble and is superior in 
profitable companies, which might imply that firms manipulate depreciation for earnings 
management. Third, four regressions (two with variable of interest abnormal depreciation, 
one with depreciation index and one with useful life of assets) yield the same result, that is 
market does not react to depreciation manipulation.  
This paper contributes to the literature on earnings management which, according to Bartov 
(1993) and Hillier and McCrae (1998) is quite unexplored. Moreover, the study resolves the 
dispute in the existing literature on depreciation manipulation. The study uses formula 
created by Jennings and Marques (2006), which has never been published, thus the paper 
helps to get the work of authors public.  The results obtained by employing four different 
methodologies give a new perspective on depreciation manipulation for a ―real market‖, to 
be more precise firms can mislead market via the calculation of the depreciation expense, 
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as market does not react to this manipulation. Finally, the paper creates new questions and 
areas for exploration in finance research literature.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section reviews pertinent 
literature and develops the research questions. Section three explains how the final sample 
was obtained. Section four outlines the methodology used in this study. Section five reports 
the descriptive statistics and reports the results. The last section concludes the paper and 
suggests some lines for future research.   
 
2. Literature review and research questions 
2.1 Earnings manipulation and management  
In finance, manipulation can be defined as an act where false signal or information is being 
sent in order to make investors purchase or vend specific securities, to make a gain out of 
this operation (Ogut et al., 2009). It can be classified into three categories, as it can be 
action-based, trade-based or information-based manipulation (Allan and Gale, 1992).  
Financial information manipulation is also called accounting manipulation and, according 
to Beneish (2001), it is vaguely different from earnings management. As a result, the two 
terms are sometimes used interchangeably.  Earnings manipulation can be defined as 
―intentional misstatements or omissions of amounts and disclosures in financial statements 
to deceive users‖ (Arens and Loebbecke, 2000). On the other hand, earnings management 
has been defined by Healy and Wahlen (1999), which state that ―earnings management is 
an action where managers apply judgment in constructing transaction or in financial 
reporting to modify financial reports, in order to mislead shareholder about the firm’s 
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financial performance or make an impact on contractual outcomes that depend on this 
information‖.  
According to Ayres (1994) there are three ways of managing earnings. The first is accrual 
management, which can be explained as a desire to modify earnings by varying items such 
as useful lives, probability to recover debts and other.  The second way is to alter the timing 
of the introduction of obligatory accounting policies. The final way is to change from one 
accounting method to another.   
 
2.2 Reasons and consequences of earnings management  
Healy and Wahlen (1999) find three main reasons for earning management: capital market 
motivations, regulation and contract motivation. Some examples of capital market 
motivation are found in Dechow et al.’s (1996) research, which point out that significant 
stimulus for earnings manipulation is an aspiration to attract external financing at low cost 
and to avoid debt covenant restrictions.  Moreover, Stubben (2006) reveals that accruals 
management is being used to meet firms’ earnings and sales forecasts. Regulation motives 
are found by Altamuro et al. (2005), which indicate that companies manipulate revenue 
recognition due to the desire to meet industry benchmarks. Finally, contractual motivation 
can be portrayed by Bartov (1993) research, where the author introduces earnings-
smoothing (when earnings manipulating is being used to reduce the fluctuation from the 
company’s normal state) and debt-equity hypothesis (positive correlation exists between 
debt to equity ratio and earnings manipulation).  
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Earnings management has several consequences on company’s results and its appearance to 
the stakeholders. Barton and Simko (2002) find that authors reveal that ―the penalty 
imposed by the market per penny of earnings per share (EPS) missed is more severe for 
firms missing by a penny than by a larger amount―. Dechow et al. (1996) indicate that once 
earnings manipulation becomes known to the public, the price of the share drops 
accordingly to the amount that is perceived to be overstated. Consequently, the cost of 
capital for these companies increases.  Beneish (1997) finds that companies that have 
violated GAAP, in order to favorably improve the financial reports, experience abnormal 
negative returns for the following two years.   
 
2.3 Depreciation manipulation  
One way to manage earnings is to smooth them by manipulating depreciation. As there is 
some flexibility for calculation of the depreciation amount, firms may window-dress their 
accounts to a certain extent (Brenton and Stolowy, 2004). Beck (2003) quotes Wexler 
(economist at Merrill Lynch, 2001), which states that depreciation manipulation accounted 
for 25% of the improvements in second-quarter profits (S&P500 firms). Hiller and Mccrae 
(1998) study the earnings smoothing potential of systematic depreciation and find that 
manipulation can be achieved in two ways: (i) via switching depreciation method and (ii) 
changing estimation of assets’ useful life.  
Switching depreciation methods: Myers (1967) was the first to analyze this topic. The 
author finds that the switch of depreciation method by companies in 1965 and 1966 had a 
positive impact on earnings per share. The author also notes that depreciation manipulation 
can be done only once and that the impact of this kind of earnings management is 
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restricted. For instance, the switch of depreciation method allows firm to build up an 
―earnings bank‖, which will be used upcoming year and the need to have another one will 
require to change accounting procedures once more
1
. Comiskey (1971) indicates that a 
change from accelerated to straight line depreciation accounting method increases the 
reported earnings per share in all the companies included in her study of the steel market. 
Archibald (1972) does not find abnormal performance of the stock during the 
announcement of the change of depreciation method.  Finally, Jackson et al. (2008) find 
that the number of firms using accelerated depreciation method for all or some of their 
depreciable assets have dropped from roughly 31 percent in 1988 to around 14 percent in 
2006. Results indicate that the choice of depreciation method makes an impact on firm’s 
management decisions regarding limited capital resource.  
Changing the estimation of useful life of assets’: Bartov (1993) reveals that income from 
the sale of assets in the companies that experience low income are higher than in the ones 
who are having high incomes, which suggests the conclusion of manipulation of timing of 
the assets. More recent research by Gunny (2005) indicates that manipulation of timing of 
asset sale (in a sense of earnings management) has a negative economic impact on the 
operating results of the following period (earnings and cash flow). Herrmann et al. (2003) 
reveal that ―in case firms report current operating income is below (above) management's 
forecasted number, firms tend to increase (decrease) earnings through the sale of fixed 
assets‖ (this research was conducted on Japanese firms).  
 
 
                                                 
1
According to Myers (1967) earnings bank refers to additional money that stays in a firm when depreciation method is changed.   
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2.4 Research questions   
Plummer and Mets (2001) comment that although prior research suggests that ―firms 
manage earnings to achieve certain reporting objectives, the literature provides limited 
evidence on which specific components or accruals are used for earnings management‖. 
Hillier and McCrae (1998) state that although there were numerous studies made on 
earnings smoothening, ―only a few of those has concentrated on depreciation‖. Bartov 
(1993) also indicates that the potential of depreciation to smoothen earnings                                                                                                                                                                          
and ability to manipulate depreciation method is quite unexplored.  This paper aims at 
filling the gap that is present in the earnings management literature with regard to 
depreciation manipulation. Specifically, two research questions will be addressed. The first 
is whether firms currently manage earnings via depreciation expenses. If the answer to the 
first research question is positive the second research question is whether the market reacts 
to this manipulation. Finding a negative market reaction for manipulation would indicate 
that capital markets can see through manager’s manipulation of this value. On the other 
hand, finding no market reaction suggests that firms can fool the market via the calculation 
of the depreciation expense.    
 
3. Sample  
The sample selection process begins with all firms included in the S&P500. According to 
Perry et al. (2001), this index is relevant due to its economic significance, more precisely 
size of the firms. Laudicina (2005) state that results reported by the S&P 500 firms are 
more applicable to the research, as it is most generally referenced U.S. equity standard. 
Research is conducted using yearly financial statements. Ogut et al. (2009) state that even 
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though manipulation of accounting methods can occur in the middle of the year, it is 
important to study year-end financial statements, as they are accessible for public use and 
are employed by investors and analysts.  
The calculation of the firms included in the final sample is described in Table 1. Firms 
belonging to financial and utilities industries were excluded due to their specific regulation. 
This is done by using the Global Industry Classification Standards (GICS), which 
according to Bhojraj et al. (2003), are significantly better in various settings of capital 
markets research than other industry classification schemes. This yields a potential sample 
of 385 firms. Due to time constraints, we randomly select 223 firms. The sample period 
covers a period of 9 years (from 1998 to 2007).  
Data is collected from two sources. First, the information needed for the calculation of 
abnormal depreciation and useful life of assets is retrieved from Compustat quarterly 
database. Second, market reaction information is collected from CRSP.   
 
4. Methodology  
In this study we use four different proxies for identification of depreciation manipulation. 
The first two are measures of abnormal depreciation. The third is a measure of depreciation 
index. The fourth proxy is a measure of manipulation of the useful life of assets. Each one 
of these proxies is then used in an event study, in order to assess if the market reacts to 
firms that manipulate depreciation when the earnings announcements are made. 
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4.1. Measures of abnormal depreciation, depreciation index and manipulation of 
useful life  
The first abnormal depreciation variable (ABDEP1) is calculated following Marquardt and 
Wiedman’s (2004) method. It is based on the calculation of the expected value of 
depreciation, which is assumed to remain a constant in proportion with gross property, 
plant, and equipment and its subtraction from the ―real‖ value of depreciation.  
, , 1 , , 1 , 1ABDEP1 * & / & /j t j t j t j t j tDEP DEP GrossPP E GrossPP E TA  
 Net depreciation (Q2), coded as ―Depreciation Net Qtly‖ in Compustat. 
 Gross PP&E (Q), coded as ―PP&E-Total Gross Qtly‖ in Compustat. 
 Total Assets (Q), coded as ―Total Assets Qtly‖ in Compustat. 
The second abnormal depreciation variable (ABDEP2) and useful life of asset (UL) is 
calculated by using formula created by Jennings and Marques (2006)
3
. Authors, after the 
revision of existing literature, look at a case study of ―Waste Management, Inc.‖, which 
mentions three items to be compared at an industry level: percent of Net PP&E in Assets 
(capital intensity), useful life, and a ration of depreciation/revenues. Thus, authors suggest 
calculating useful life of asset. The analysis of this item should portray the willingness to 
manipulate depreciation.  
onDepreciati
EPMeanGrossP
UL
&
 
                                                 
2 Q - quarterly data 
3 Jennings and Marques was working on the topic ―The manipulation depreciation‖, though the paper has not been published. The paper 
aimed at ―assesing if or not there has been recent and widespread manipulation of earningsm via changes in depreciation plocies‖. 
Furthermore, second step was to investigate possible consequences of manipulation. I would like to thank for Prof. Ana Marques 
(Universidade Nova de Lisboa) and Prof. Ross Jennings (University of Texas at Austin) for allowing using thier unpublished formulas 
and findings.  
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 Gross depreciation (Q), coded as ―Depreciation Gross Qtly‖ in Compustat. 
 Gross PP&E (Q), coded as ―PP&E-Total Gross Qtly‖ in Compustat. 
The useful life of asset is an important item for the calculation of unexpected depreciation.  
&
ABDEP2
MeanGrossPP E
Depreciation
lagUL
 
 Gross depreciation (Q), coded as ―Depreciation Gross Qtly‖ in Compustat. 
 Gross PP&E (Q), coded as ―PP&E-Total Gross Qtly‖ in Compustat. 
It is important to emphasize that the calculation might be biased due the fact that 
Compustat database yield depreciation and amortization as one item named depreciation 
and there is none specific item for land.  
The third depreciation variable (DEP_INDEX) is calculated by using Beneish’s (1997) 
methodology. The author indicates that a depreciation index greater than one is an indicator 
of the slow down of the rate by which assets have been depreciated. This can occur due to 
two reasons: firm has switched its depreciation method in order to increase earnings or 
estimation of asset’s useful life has been raised. 
1 1 1/ ( & )DEP _ INDEX
/ ( & )
t t t
t t t
Depreciation Depreciation PP E
Depreciation Depreciation PP E
 
 Gross depreciation (Q), coded as ―Depreciation Gross Qtly‖ in Compustat. 
 Gross PP&E (Q), coded as ―PP&E-Total Gross Qtly‖ in Compustat. 
These results can be sorted by applying Zatta (2005) criteria. This is needed to be done as 
―indexes are not foolproof and have frequently produced erroneous results‖ (Harrington, 
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2005).  According to Zatta (2005), the depreciation index needs to be interpreted by looking 
at it in the multiple period samples. Moreover, the author states ―if the rate of depreciation 
falls over two periods, it raises the possibility that the company has boosted its estimates of 
assets’ useful lives or adopted a new depreciation method that increases income‖. This 
method yielded 23 companies in the sample, which probably manipulated depreciation. For 
these companies an indicator variable is created, in which manipulators are coded as 1 and 
non-manipulators as 0.  
 
4.2. Reaction to abnormal depreciation and manipulation of useful life  
The next part of this study tests market reactions to the abnormal depreciation and the 
manipulation of the useful life of assets. Equations 1, 2 and 3 correspond to the three 
different proxies for abnormal depreciation discussed above. Equation 4 analyzes the 
reaction to the manipulation of useful life. The models are as follows: 
CAR = 0 
variables of interest:  + 1 ABDEP1 
other variables:  + 2 UNE + 3UNS + 4 SIZE                                (1) 
   
CAR = 0 
variables of interest:  + 1 ABDEP2 
other variables:  + 2 UNE + 3UNS + 4 SIZE                                (2) 
   
CAR = 0 
variables of interest:  + 1 DEP_INDEX 
other variables:  + 2 UNE + 3UNS + 4 SIZE+ 5DM                    (3) 
 
CAR = 0 
variables of interest:  + 1 UL 
other variables:  + 2 UNE + 3UNS + 4 SIZE                                (4) 
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In order to measure market reaction, an event study is conducted, with its 3-day window 
centred at the date of the earnings announcement. The study is made by using the 4
th
 
quarter earnings’ announcement day, as it contains the yearly performance of the company. 
Normal return in this study refers to the firm-specific daily return, while the expected return 
is calculated using a value-weighted index.  
The control variables used in regressions were unexpected earnings (UNE), unexpected 
sales (UNS), and size (SIZE). According to Hsu (2002), unexpected earnings occur when 
company’s reported earnings deviate from analysts’ forecasts and are considered to be a 
useful tool in predicting abnormal returns. In this study, unexpected earnings are calculated 
as a real value minus value of the same quarter last year. Moreover, unexpected sales are 
calculated in the same manner. According to Kothari (2001), the size of a company is 
related to the abnormal returns during earnings announcement days. This variable is 
calculated as natural logarithm of total assets.  
 
5. Findings 
5.1. Descriptive statistics 
Descriptive statistics of all variables used in the four regressions, before scaling the data 
and excluding outliers are presented in table 3. As we can see from the table, dependent 
variable CAR is varying substantially.  According to Seiler (2000), this variability could 
have been caused by the type of methodology used to perform the event study.  Extreme 
data points are found in unexpected earning and unexpected sales variables as well. These 
could be explained by the nature of S&P500 as it is composed of companies of different 
size, belonging to diverse sectors. The descriptive statistics of variables of interest indicates 
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outliers that could be further investigated for earning manipulation. For example, 
DEP_INDEX has a maximum value of 3,68 (and more than one suggest earnings 
management).  
According to Evans (1997), outliers’ identification is significant in regression analysis as 
outliers can impact model in such way that it will make the conclusions of study biased. In 
order to eliminate this impact, 2% of extreme data points are removed (1% from each side). 
As expected, this procedure increased adjusted R-squared of the regression lines. The first 
regression, for example, had a adjusted R-squared of 0,4% before procedure and 5,47% 
after it.  In addition to that, scaling is made by dividing variables by market value, as this 
procedure allows normalizing data. 
Table 3 shows the correlation between variables. The table depict that variables have a 
weak (coefficient from -0,2 to 0,2) relationship (by Pearson and Spearman correlation)
4
, 
where the strongest one are seen between CAR and unexpected sales and the two of the 
proxies for abnormal depreciation, ABDEP1 and ABDEP2, which are also strongly 
correlated (0,684). Moreover, this relationship is statistically significant (p-value of 0.000).  
All of the regressions have positive significant correlation between CAR and unexpected 
sales, which suggests that market reacts positively to unexpected sales (as expected in line 
with Hsu, 2002). On the other hand, the table depict that there is a low positive correlation 
between CAR and ABDEP1, and ABDEP2 (respectively 0,018 and 0,011), suggesting that 
when abnormal depreciation is increasing CAR is increasing as well, and low negative 
correlation between CAR and DEP_INDEX, and UL (respectively -0,03 and -0,014), 
suggesting that when abnormal depreciation or useful life of asset is increasing CAR is 
                                                 
4 Spearman correlation indicates relationship between X and Y, when they are related by any monotonic fuction, while Pearson 
correlation is a result of a linear fuction between X and Y.  
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decreasing.  In addition, table 3 shows that significance correlation is found between UL 
and SIZE (0,030), UNE and SIZE (0,006) ABDEP1 and UNS (0,005), UNS and SIZE 
(0,041), ABDEP2 and SIZE (0,013), and UNE and SIZE (0,001). 
Table 4, panel A presents analysis of useful life of assets for a timeframe from 1999 to 
2007. This suggests that, on average, until the ―dot com bubble burst‖ the useful life of the 
assets in the sample companies was decreasing and after this event it has a tendency to 
increase. This implies smaller depreciation expenses and larger net income (2001-
onwords), which is an important figure for analysts, investors and market in general. 
Moreover, t-test, represented in a third column of the table, evaluates if the change from 
one year to another is significant; we can see that these changes were significant from 2001 
to 2002, from 2002 – 2003, and from 2005 to 2006. The significant change in 2001-2002 
reconfirms assumption that after ―dot com bubble burst‖, the increase in useful life of assets 
is statistically significant. 2002-2003 significance can be explained by recovering economy 
after slowdown in 2001. 2005-2006 corporate earnings were slowing down due to rising 
rates and commodities’ prices (Mellody Hubson, President of Ariel Capiltal Management, 
2006).  
Additionally, table 4, panel B reveals that profitable companies on average have higher 
useful life of the assets than firms with a loss. These results might suggest earnings 
management by manipulating useful life of assets (one of the ways to manipulate 
depreciation). T-test reconfirms that difference between these two values is significant.  
 
5.2. Results of event study 
All the models are tested by Hausman test, which according to Brooks (2008) allows 
determining which is the most suitable way to run a regression – using fixed effects or 
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random effects. Fixed effects are used when it is important to control for omitted variables 
that vary among cases but are invariable over time. The model gives more consistent 
results, but might not be most efficient model to run. Random effects are used to control for 
omitted variables that alter over time but are constant between cases. The model gives 
better P-values, but it might be inconsistent due to omitted variables. In this study, 
estimation regressions are ran by using random effects.  
Table 5 represent the estimation results for the four linear regressions. The results obtained 
provide no support to the second hypothesis that the market reacts to depreciation 
manipulation, since there is no relationship between CAR and ABDEP1, ABDEP2, 
DEP_INDEX, and UL. In fact, all estimated coefficients are not statistically significant. 
This result is consistent with the correlation coefficients present in table 3 – a weak, and 
close to zero correlation. On the other hand, the estimated coefficients for unexpected sales 
are all positive and statistically significant, as expected. Size is the other variable that is 
statistically significant, but only in regressions 1 and 4. Adjusted R
2
 is 5,47%, 5,03%, 
4,78%, and 3,04% (respectively to each regression). This suggests that the fourth proxy is 
the least informative one.  
The result that markets do not react to depreciation manipulation is in line with several 
previous findings. Archibald (1972) finds no abnormal performance of stock during the 
announcement of the change of depreciation method. Moreover, some authors have 
predicted similar results. Beneish (1997) stated ―earnings management via depreciation is 
potentially transparent (because changes in estimates that alter depreciation expense are 
disclosed in footnotes) and economically implausible (because of timing of capital 
expenditures would need to be discovered partly from the arrival of profitable investments 
opportunities)‖.  Peasnell et al. (2000), state that earnings management through 
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depreciation manipulation is ―a somewhat transparent‖, it does make an impact to the 
market price of the firm.  
On the other hand, Comiskey (1971) finds that depreciation manipulation increases 
earnings per share. Dechow (1996) states that once earnings management is known the 
price of the stock drops. Beneish (1997) indicates that companies which violate GAAP 
experience negative abnormal returns for two following years.  Taking into account that 
four different proxies are used in this study, the findings in this paper should end the 
dispute: financial markets do not react to depreciation manipulation.  
 
6. Conclusion 
This study analyzes a sample of S&P500 firms, using four different methods to identify 
firms which may be manipulating earnings via depreciation and assesses the extent of the 
market reaction to this possible manipulation.  
There are three important results. First, abnormal depreciation methodologies used in this 
study proved that firms manipulate depreciation to a certain extent. Second, useful life of 
assets over the sample has a tendency to increase since the dot com burst and is superior in 
profitable companies, which might imply firms manipulate depreciation for earnings 
management. Third, all specifications of the event study conducted regressions yield the 
same result: capital markets do not react to depreciation manipulation.  
Overall the results are different from the commonly held believe (which were found in 
some studies) that the market should react negatively to depreciation manipulation. There 
are, however, some limitations to this study. First, boundaries of event study. Seiler (2000) 
states that correct identification of ―real‖ values is vital for accurate detection of abnormal 
performance. Thus, alternative performance measures could have been used: mean adjusted 
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returns, market adjusted returns, control portfolios, or risk adjusted returns. Second, the 
models used in the study may not be able to capture depreciation manipulation, for example 
Harrington (2005) quotes Beneish, author of one of the methodologies used state, ―the best 
rate of success we had for the earning management index is 50 percent‖.  Third, data from 
Compustat gives a combined data of amortization and depreciation, which may have an 
impact on results.  
Future studies could create a different method for calculation abnormal depreciation and 
investigate the relation between depreciation manipulation and corporate governance 
policies of firms. 
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Table 1 – Sample 
 
Panel A: Sample selection  
 
S&P500 firms 500 
Financial institutions (GICS=40) 81 
Utilities (GICS=55) 34 
Potential sample 385 
Firms with data problems 162 
Final sample 223 
 
Panel B: Sample division into industries  
  Final Sample S&P 500 
Energy 10 9,9% 10,1% 
Materials 15 7,7% 7,5% 
Industrials 20 16,2% 15,3% 
Consumer Discretionary 25 21,2% 20,8% 
Consumer Staples 30 11,3% 10,4% 
Health Care 35 12,2% 14,0% 
Information Technology 45 18,9% 19,5% 
Telecommunications Services 50 2,7% 2,3% 
Note: The percentage is calculated by excluding  financial and utility sectors 
 
Table 2 – Descriptive statistics 
  Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
CAR 1953 -0,00042 0,00483 -0,1477 0,1658 
UNE 1982 74,66 2599,54 -54993,45 51446,76 
SIZE 2007 6,8109 0,5489 4,5373 8,9006 
UNS 1959 1173,24 3961,42 -18573,78 64224,89 
UL 2007 12,7964 6,4834 0,0423 59,5287 
ABDEP1 1989 0,0031 0,2088 -0,6504 9,2648 
ABDEP2 1999 -0,0016 0,0292 -0,8494 0,2028 
DEP_INDEX 2007 1,0220 0,2301 0,2143 3,6856 
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Table 3 – Correlation and statically significance   
 
  CAR UL UNS UNE SIZE ABDEP2 DEP_INDEX ABDEP1 
CAR 1,000 -0,016 0,036 0,022 0,050 0,046 0,038 0,034 
UL -0,015 1,000 0,025 -0,023 0,015 -0,022 0,031 -0,01 
UNS 0,047 0,004 1,000 0,065 -0,081 0,077 0,015 -0,025 
UNE 0,005 -0,010 0,059 1,000 -0,025 0,003 -0,012 0,016 
SIZE 0,040 0,045 -0,041 -0,072 1,000 -0,078 0,023 0,019 
ABDEP2 0,023 0,029 0,041 -0,034 -0,052 1,000 0,007 0,684 
DEP_INDEX 0,040 0,025 -0,003 -0,008 0,019 0,011 1,000 0,008 
ABDEP1 0,024 0,023 -0,062 -0,024 0,009 0,173 0,003 1,000 
Spearman/Pearson 
Correlation 
CAR . 0,261 0,023 0,420 0,046 0,168 0,047 0,159 
UL 0,261 . 0,427 0,338 0,030 0,114 0,145 0,162 
UNS 0,023 0,427 . 0,006 0,041 0,043 0,454 0,005 
UNE 0,420 0,338 0,006 . 0,001 0,073 0,373 0,155 
SIZE 0,046 0,030 0,041 0,001 . 0,013 0,209 0,347 
ABDEP2 0,168 0,114 0,043 0,073 0,013 . 0,316 0,000 
DEP_INDEX 0,047 0,145 0,454 0,373 0,209 0,316 . 0,445 
ABDEP1 0,159 0,162 0,005 0,155 0,347 0,000 0,445 . 
Sig. (1-tailed) 
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Table 4 – Characteristics of useful life of asset  
Panel A: analysis made by years 
Year Useful Life of Asset T-test  
1999 11,75  
2000 11,67 0,515 
2001 11,73 0,742 
2002 12,92 0,000 
2003 13,25 0,038 
2004 13,41 0,202 
2005 13,29 0,399 
2006 13,52 0,037 
2007 13,62 0,432 
  
Panel B: analysis by loss/profit firms 
Firms’ profitability Useful Life of Asset T-test 
Positive 13,10  
Negative 10,45 0,023 
 
Table 5 – Results of linear regressions (dependent variable – CAR) 
  
 Regression 1 
(ABDEP1) 
Regression 2 
(ABDEP2) 
Regression 3 
(DEP_INDEX) 
Regression 4 (UL) 
 Coef. P-value Coef. P-value Coef. P-value Coef. P-value 
UNE 1,3775 0,491 1,4828 0,458   1,1954   0,877 2,5721 0,739 
SIZE 0,0018 0,078 0,0022 0,032       0,0197 0,059     0,0022 0,033 
UNS 5,4144   0,047 5,7249   0,035 7,0515 0,010 6,1738 0,023 
ABDEP1 0,0601 0,492      - - - - - - 
ABDEP2 - - 0,0182   0,342  - - - - 
DEP_INDEX - - - - -0,0444 0,182 - - 
DM - - - - 0,0059 0,215   - - 
UL - - - - - -   
_cons -0,0135 0,059 -0,0160 0,023 -0,0100 0,221 -0,0006    0,479     
         
Number of 
observations 
Adj. R-squared 
1808 
0,0547                                         
1839 
 
0,0503                                         
1811 
 
0,0478                                     
1844 
 
0,0304                                     
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